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THE CAPE YORK WELFARE REFORM — 
CONTINUING ACTS OF PATERNALISM 
FIONA CAMPBELL* 
The Queensland Government has managed Aboriginal peoples’ property since at least 
1897. Today, in four predominantly Aboriginal communities in Cape York and 
Doomadgee in the Gulf of Carpentaria, the Family Responsibilities Commission can 
direct Centrelink to manage up to 90 per cent of a person’s social security payment if they 
fail to meet one of four ‘social responsibilities’.  If social security payments could be found 
to be property, as occurs in European countries, income management of Aboriginal 
people’s social security payments arguably breaches the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 
(Cth) and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (Queensland Discriminatory Laws) 
Act 1975 (Cth) which require equality for Aboriginal peoples in exercising their right to 
own and manage property.  If social security cannot be found to be property, a court is 
likely to find income management to be a special measure for the benefit of Aboriginal 
people.       
I INTRODUCTION 
In 1975 the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (‘RDA’) was enacted to incorporate Australia’s 
international obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Racial Discrimination 1966 (‘ICERD’)1 into domestic law.2 The RDA was enacted to prohibit 
racial discrimination and to enable ‘special measures’ to promote the equal enjoyment of human 
rights, including the right to own property. The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (Queensland 
Discriminatory Laws) Act 1975 (Cth) (‘ATSI (QDL) Act’) was also passed by the Commonwealth 
to counteract Queensland legislation and practice which enabled discriminatory State Government 
control over Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples,3 mainly on Government and church 
reserves. This control included management of their property, particularly their wages, without 
their consent.  
                                                 
*  BSocSc, BA (Hons) (Charles Sturt University), LLB (Hons), Grad Dip Legal Practice (Wollongong), PhD student, 
James Cook University. I gratefully acknowledge and thank Professor Chris Cunneen and Dr Loretta de Plevitz 
for their supervision, guidance and helpful comments and suggestions on this article. I also acknowledge and thank 
the peer reviewers for their comments and views. 
1  Opened for signature 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969).  
2  The International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 1966 (‘ICERD’) is 
integrated into the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (‘RDA’) through its attachment as a schedule to the RDA 
through Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) s 3(1). 
3  Aborigines Act 1971 (Qld); Aborigines Regulation 1972 (Qld); Aborigines Act and Torres Strait Islanders 
Amendment Act 1974 (Qld). 
QUT Law Review Volume 15, Issue 1, 2015 
Page | 115 
 
Prior to and after the 1975 Acts, the Queensland Government continued to exploit Aboriginal 
people through the underpayment of wages and mismanagement of their monies.4 This policy, 
administered through its Protectors and administrators of Christian missions, required rural 
Aboriginal workers in the pastoral industry to request funds or vouchers for local stores, and 
provide information on what was to be bought. How, and if, the money was distributed was subject 
to approval.5 In Bligh v Queensland the complainants argued that up until 1984 they were 
discriminated against and underpaid by the Queensland Government in their employment on the 
Palm Island Aboriginal Reserve.6 Commissioner Bill Carter found for the complainants, stating 
that ‘[b]ecause of their Aboriginality they were dealt with differently; by reason of their race alone 
they were perceived as lacking an entitlement to the enjoyment of a fundamental human right, 
namely, the right to equal pay for equal work’.7     
Today, the Cape York Welfare Reform (‘CYWR’), the Family Responsibilities Commission Act 
2008 (Qld) (‘FRC Act’) and the Social Security (Administration) Act 1991 (Cth) enable Centrelink 
to manage a person’s social security payment without their consent and to exercise excessive 
controls over the way in which the payment may be spent. Under this regime up to 90 per cent of 
a person’s social security payments can be income managed and the purposes for which it can be 
used are extremely limited, with minimal discretionary income available.8 Where an income 
managed person has bills such as rent, automated payments are established, and a ‘BasicsCard’ is 
issued, limiting what can be purchased and where money can be spent. The CYWR applies to the 
predominantly Aboriginal communities of Aurukun, Hope Vale, Coen and Mossman Gorge. 
The Queensland and Commonwealth Governments have rationalised income management and the 
supporting legislation as a special measure under the RDA,9 discussed below, despite income 
management impinging on the rights of the social security recipient. This is important due to the 
discriminatory application of income management and the detrimental impact it can have on 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. As well as being a means of controlling Aboriginal 
people, protectionist legislation has been described as eliminating personal autonomy and forcing 
                                                 
4  Tony Fitzgerald, ‘Cape York Justice Study: The Situation of Cape York Indigenous Communities’ (Interim Report, 
Vol 2, Queensland Department of the Premier and Cabinet, 2001) 15–17. 
5  Rosalind Kidd, The Requirement for Accountability <http://www.linksdisk.com/roskidd/tpages/t28.htm>. 
6  Bligh v Queensland [1996] HREOC 28. 
7  [1996] HREOC 28, 31, 32. 
8  Explanatory Notes, Family Responsibilities Commission Bill 2008 (Qld) 11. See also Cape York Institute for 
Policy and Leadership, ‘From Hand Out to Hand Up: Cape York Welfare Reform Project, Aurukun, Coen, Hope 
Vale, Mossman Gorge, Design Recommendations’ (May 2007) 19–22, 26, 36, 44, 58, 64–7, 71, 79, 98, 121; 
Department of Social Services, Families and Children, What is Welfare Reform? <http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/our-
responsibilities/families-and-children/publications-articles/cape-york-welfare-reform-fact-sheets/what-is-
welfare-reform>. 
9  Explanatory Notes, Family Responsibilities Commission Bill 2008 (Qld) 11. This is also the case in regard to the 
Northern Territory Intervention (‘NTI’). Cape York Institute for Policy and Leadership, above n 8, 19–22, 26, 36, 
44, 58, 64–7, 71, 79, 98, 121; Department of Social Services, Families and Children, above n 8. 
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people into demoralised dependence.10 One of the aims of the CYWR is to ‘normalise’ and change 
behaviour of Aboriginal people to that of the dominant culture.11    
This paper focuses on income management as a breach of the prohibition against managing the 
property, without their consent, of an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander person living under the 
current Queensland CYWR.12 Social security payments have been held to be property in overseas 
jurisdictions, including by the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECHR’).13 Domestically, 
property rights are broadly defined, and to an even greater extent when recognised as human rights. 
Both property law and human rights law recognise a number of different relationships. Therefore, 
the use of the term ‘property’ is potentially capable of being interpreted as sufficiently broad to 
encompass social security payments in Australia.  
Judicial reasoning from the High Court case of Maloney v The Queen suggests that it is likely that 
involuntary income management will be found to be discriminatory but excepted from the 
prohibition of racial discrimination, as a special measure.14 Special measures take their meaning 
directly from Art 1(4) of the ICERD. The ICERD defines special measures to be policy, legislation 
or programs implemented to assist a racial or ethnic group or individuals who have suffered 
historical disadvantage caused by racism, to enjoy human rights to the same extent as others. Often 
these human rights include education, property, employment, social security and safety and 
wellbeing. 
Special measures enable a disadvantaged group to be treated differently, where the treatment 
occurs in order to secure the enjoyment of human rights on an equal footing. An issue that arises 
in Australia is that the High Court has held that the goal of the special measure is to be determined 
by the Parliament, and not by those who are disadvantaged.15 Therefore its aim may be unclear to 
its purported ‘beneficiaries’, being based on Government expectations that the disadvantaged 
group want the same outcomes as the dominant culture. The measure may also be aimed not only 
at disadvantage, but also at cultural difference.16    
Given the current interpretation of special measures under the RDA, a different approach is 
required in arguing that income management of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ 
social security payments is discriminatory. A case can be mounted that income management is 
discriminatory based on social security as property managed without the consent of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander people. This paper explores the applicability of the RDA and ATSI (QDL) 
Act as protection against discriminatory and unwanted interference with social security payments.  
                                                 
10  Shelley Bielefeld, ‘Compulsory Income Management and Indigenous Australians: Delivering Social Justice or 
Furthering Colonial Domination?’ (1998) 35(2) UNSW Law Journal 522, 534. 
11  Department of Social Services, Families and Children, above n 8. 
12  Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) s 10(3); Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders (Queensland Discriminatory 
Laws Act) 1975 (Cth) s 5(1). 
13  See, eg, Stec v United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Application No 65731/01, 6 
July 2005); Abdulaziz v United Kingdom A94 (1985) 7 Eur Court HR 471; Kjartan Ásmundsson v Iceland [2004] 
ECHR 512; Gaygusuz v Austria [1996] Eur Court HR 36; Moskal v Poland (2010) Eur Court HR 22.  
14  Maloney v The Queen [2013] HCA 28. 
15  Ibid. 
16  Jennifer Nielson, ‘Whiteness and Anti-Discrimination Law: It’s in the Design’ (2008) 4(2) Australian Critical 
Race and Whiteness Studies Association E-Journal, 3–5, 9–10 
<http://www.acrawsa.org.au/files/ejournalfiles/52NielsenInthedesignFINAL.pdf>.  
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If social security can be characterised as property, both the RDA and ATSI (QDL) Act preclude the 
argument advanced by Governments that management of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples’ social security payments without their consent is a special measure. It is, therefore, 
important to assess whether social security is definable as property, as this may provide a stronger 
legal argument upon which to base a challenge to the discriminatory impacts of income 
management under the CYWR. 
II PAST POLICIES AND LEGISLATION FOR MANAGING ABORIGINAL PEOPLES’ MONEY AND 
PROPERTY 
The Queensland Government or churches previously controlled the five CYWR communities, with 
residents required to comply with strict rules governing all aspects of their lives. From 1897, the 
Queensland Government managed the property of Aboriginal people under its control, as they 
were considered incapable of doing so. Management included possession, sale or disposal of a 
person’s property.17 By 1919, the wages of rural Aboriginal workers were paid to the Government 
and pocket money doled out to the workers. Reserve workers were not paid at all. Requests for 
funds or vouchers were often rejected depending on the Protector’s view of the need for particular 
goods. There was widespread fraud by Protectors and others relying on poorly kept records and 
unused withdrawal slips already thumb-printed and witnessed.18 Aboriginal people often had to 
travel hours to a Protector. Police acting as Protectors refused requests on the basis that they were 
too busy or because they considered them unjustified.19 Despite a stated policy to protect against 
exploitation,  in practice the Government itself exploited Aboriginal people through underpayment 
of wages and mismanagement of their monies.20 The Aboriginal Preservation and Protection Act 
1939–1946 (Qld) required a percentage of wages to be contributed to a welfare fund for the general 
benefit of Aboriginal people,21 and that all Aboriginal people living on reserves and settlements 
work without pay on development and maintenance for up to 32 hours a week.22     
While this was occurring, Aboriginal families were living in dire poverty, despite the Queensland 
Government holding $16.8 million of Aboriginal peoples’ money by the 1960s.23 The Queensland 
Government also seized Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ child endowment and 
pensions, leaving only one-third of payments for pensioners,24 and taking 80 per cent of maternity 
                                                 
17  Aboriginal Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897 (Qld) ss 17, 26(4); See Kathy Frankland, ‘A 
Brief History of Government Administration of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples in Queensland’ in 
Records Guide Volume 1: A Guide to Queensland Government Records Relating to Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander People (Queensland State Archives and Department of Family Services and Islander Affairs, 1994) 
<http://www.slq.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/93734/Admin_History_Aboriginal_and_Torres_Strait_I
slanders.pdf>. 
18  Kidd, above n 5. 
19  Kidd, above n 5.  
20  Fitzgerald, above n 4, 15–17.  
21  Five per cent of gross earnings for a person without dependants and ten per cent from those with dependants. This 
money was withheld from the wage paid to the person.  
22  Loretta de Plevitz, ‘Working for the Man: Wages Lost to Queensland Workers “Under the Act”’ (1996) 3(81) 
Aboriginal Law Bulletin 4, 37; Margaret Thornton and Trish Luker, ‘The Wages of Sin: Compensation for 
Indigenous Workers’ (2009) 32(3) UNSW Law Journal 649. 
23  Fitzgerald, above n 4, 15–17. 
24  Kidd, above n 5. 
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allowances for mothers living in settlement dormitories and 50 per cent from those in settlement 
camps.25 Dr Rosalind Kidd records that child endowment was taken by the Queensland 
Government as late as 1984.26  
The Aborigines’ and Torres Strait Islanders’ Affairs Act 1965 (Qld) labelled all Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples living on reserves ‘assisted’, enabling management of their property 
by district officers if they were satisfied that it was in the person’s best interests.27 When the 
Aborigines Act 1971 (Qld) was passed, the term ‘assisted’ no longer applied. However, Aboriginal 
people whose property was previously managed continued to be managed unless the Protector of 
the reserve approved a request that it cease. Despite the Aborigines Regulation 1972 (Qld) 
requiring Aboriginal workers to be employed based on award conditions where they existed, 
Aboriginal workers on reserves continued to be paid under-award wages (if at all), and excluded 
from award conditions. Others were deemed aged, infirm or a slow worker and paid less.28   
In 1974, the Aborigines Act and Torres Strait Islanders Amendment Act 1974 (Qld) repealed the 
provision of the 1971 Act pertaining to management of property. Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples could then manage their own property, although they were required to complete 
and sign a written notification, witnessed by a Justice of the Peace and give it to the District 
Officer.29    
Despite three of the CYWR communities and Doomadgee being relatively isolated, they have been 
developed in a manner consistent with forced assimilation. The community members include 
people who did not belong to the land covered by reserves/missions as well as others from the area 
who were forced to live there. From being tightly controlled from their inception through so-called 
protectionist legislation,30 control over three of these communities (Hope Vale, Aurukun and 
Doomadgee) was suddenly released in the 1980s when power was handed to Aboriginal 
Councils.31 
The RDA and the ATSI (QDL) Act should be able to provide the necessary protection for these 
communities. Specifically, the aim of s 10(3) of the RDA and s 5 of the ATSI (QDL) Act, both in 
strong words and intent, is to prohibit the management of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander  
people’s property without their consent, unless such management occurs under a law of general 
application.32 These provisions are set out in the table below. 
                                                 
25  Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Unfinished Business: 
Indigenous Stolen Wages (2006) 35. 
26  Kidd, above n 5. 
27  Aborigines’ and Torres Strait Islanders' Affairs Act 1965 (Qld) s 8(1)(a).  
28  Thornton and Luker, above n 22, 649–650. 
29  Garth Nettheim, Victims of the Law: Black Queenslanders Today (George Allen & Unwin, 1981) 7. 
30  Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897 (Qld); Aboriginal Preservation and 
Protection Act 1939–1946 (Qld); Aborigines’ and Torres Strait Islanders’ Act 1965 (Qld); the Aborigines Act 1971 
(Qld); Aborigines Regulation 1972 (Qld); Aborigines Act and Torres Strait Islanders Amendment Act 1974 (Qld). 
31  Michael Limerick, ‘Indigenous Council Capacity-Building in Queensland’ (Scoping Paper, Prepared for the 
Australian Centre for Excellence of Local Government, 2010) 6–7.  
32  Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) s 10(3); Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders (Queensland Discriminatory 
Laws Act) 1975 (Cth) s 5(1). 
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Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders 
(Queensland Discriminatory Laws) Act 1975 
(Cth) 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) 
Section 5 Management of property 
(1) Subject to subsection (2), any property in 
Queensland of an Aboriginal or Islander shall not 
be managed by another person without the consent 
of the Aboriginal or Islander, and any consent 
given by an Aboriginal or Islander, whether given 
before or after the commencement of this Act, to 
the management by another person of his or her 
property may be withdrawn by the Aboriginal or 
Islander at any time. 
(2)  Subsection (1) does not apply to or in relation 
to the management of property in accordance with 
any law of Queensland or Australia that applies 
generally without regard to the race, colour, or 
national or ethnic origin of persons. 
Section 10 Rights to equality before the law 
(3) Where a law contains a provision that: 
(a) authorises property owned by an Aboriginal or 
a Torres Strait Islander to be managed by another 
person without the consent of the Aboriginal or 
Torres Strait Islander; or 
(b) prevents or restricts an Aboriginal or a Torres 
Strait Islander from terminating the management 
by another person of property owned by the 
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander; 
not being a provision that applies to persons 
generally without regard to their race, colour or 
national or ethnic origin, that provision shall be 
deemed to be a provision in relation to which 
subsection (1) applies and a reference in that 
subsection to a right includes a reference to a right 
of a person to manage property owned by the 
person. 
 
This paper explores the applicability of these Acts as protection against unwanted interference 
with social security payments. It is, therefore, important to assess whether social security is 
definable as property. If social security is classified as property, these Acts’ provisions preclude 
the argument advanced by the Governments that management of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples’ social security payments without their consent is a special measure.  
In 2007, the Commonwealth Government introduced legislation to enable the income management 
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples social security payments in ‘prescribed 
communities’ in the Northern Territory and the CYWR communities.33  In doing so the 
Commonwealth suspended Part II of the RDA, which includes s 10 and deemed income 
management a special measure. This was to prevent legal challenges against the social security 
legislation and the operation of the Family Responsibilities Commission Act 2008 (Qld) (‘FRC 
Act’).34 To counter criticism against the suspension of the RDA, the Commonwealth Government 
reinstated Part II RDA in 2010 and amended the social security legislation so that income 
                                                 
33  Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Welfare Payment Reform) Act 2007 (Cth) s 4; Families, 
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and Other Legislation Amendment (Northern Territory National 
Emergency Response and Other Measures) Act 2007 (Cth) s 4.  
34  Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Welfare Payment Reform) Act 2007 (Cth) s 4; Families, 
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and Other Legislation Amendment (Northern Territory National 
Emergency Response and Other Measures) Act 2007 (Cth) s 4.  
QUT Law Review Volume 15, Issue 1, 2015 
Page | 120 
 
management applied more broadly in the Northern Territory and around Australia.35  Nevertheless 
the income management component of the CYWR continues to specifically target Aboriginal 
peoples.  
Importantly, s 8(1) of the RDA ‘excepts measures in relation to which subsection 10(1) applies by 
virtue of subsection 10(3)’. Therefore, managing the property of an Aboriginal or Torres Strait 
Islander person without their consent cannot be a special measure. The existence of this provision 
acknowledges that Governments have portrayed legislation controlling Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples’ property without their consent as protectionist and beneficial for 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.  
However, courts have been reluctant to intrude upon the legislative prerogative of Governments. 
Judicial decisions also indicate that although the court is unwilling to enter the socio-political 
sphere, including intervening in political assessments reasonably open to the legislature to make, 
it will act when it decides a political assessment is unreasonable.36 It may be difficult for the court 
to find unreasonableness, particularly when some level of policy support for a measure is provided 
by the Government.  
While the court may find that a measure is discriminatory because it treats Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander people differently to the general population, if the political will states that the 
differential treatment is necessary to achieve substantive equality for Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people, it is likely that the court will find the treatment capable of being captured by the 
definition of a special measure. Recent judicial reasoning suggests that income management may 
not breach a person’s right to social security, because it protects the rights of the vulnerable 
(children and women in particular) to enjoy social security.37 These cases also indicate that the 
court is likely to decide income management is a special measure promoting the right to social 
security for children and women.38 If, however, social security is characterised as a proprietary 
                                                 
35  Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Welfare Reform and Reinstatement of Racial Discrimination 
Act) Act 2010 (Cth); Luke Buckmaster, Diane Spooner and Kirsty Magarey, ‘Income Management and the Racial 
Discrimination Act’ (Background Note, Department of Parliamentary Services, Parliament of Australia, 28 May 
2012) 1-2 
<http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/1511200/upload_binary/1511200.pdf;fileType=app
lication/pdf>. 
36  Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70 [137]–[139] (Brennan J), [161]–[162] (Dawson J); Aurukun Shire Council 
v CEO Office of Liquor Gaming and Racing in the Department of Treasury [2010] QCA 37 [77] (McMurdo P), 
[210]–[213] (Keane JA), [244] (Philippides J); Bropho v  State of Western Australia [2008] FCAFC 100; Maloney 
v The Queen [2013] HCA 28. 
37  Aurukun Shire Council v CEO Office of Liquor Gaming and Racing in the Department of Treasury [2010] QCA 
37; Maloney v The Queen [2013] HCA 28. 
38  ICERD, opened for signature 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969)  art 5(e)(iv); 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976), art 9; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, opened for signature 1 March 1970, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 September 1991) arts 
11(1)(e), 13(a), 14(2)(c).  
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right being managed without consent,39 then s 8(1) of the RDA may be applied, and income 
management cannot be found to be a special measure. 
Although s 5 of the ATSI (QDL) Act and s 10(3) of the RDA are worded differently, both are 
directed at the same end: prohibition of the management of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples’ property without their consent. However, reliance upon each section may produce 
different results. This stems not necessarily from the different wording of the provisions, but 
potentially from the different definitions of ‘property’ at a domestic and international level, and 
the rules of statutory interpretation. Thus the RDA, through its incorporation of ICERD and 
international human rights principles, potentially gives rise to a wider construction.40 Section 10(3) 
of the RDA refers to s 10(1) of the RDA, with the practical effect that Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people whose property is being managed without their consent will enjoy their right to 
the property ‘to the same extent as persons of other races, colour or national or ethnic origin.’41 
A finding that s 10(3) of the RDA applies, eliminates any argument of a measure being a special 
measure.42     
In domestic legislation, including the ATSI (QDL) Act, the court may consider itself as restricted 
to domestic definitions of property, which are broad, but are unlikely to be construed as widely as 
definitions of property as a human right. However, s 10 of the RDA and s 5 of the ATSI (QDL) Act, 
both implemented to target management of wages, indicate a broad definition of property. This is 
important because payment of wages is normally thought to arise due to a contractual arrangement 
of employment. Property rights and contractual rights are often contrasted. Property rights include 
a relationship with an object,43 usually enforceable against all others and contractual rights are 
enforceable against particular persons.44 Property rights may arise from contractual rights, such as 
exclusive possession under a lease.  
Social security being defined as property appears to be imperative for a court to find imposed 
income management to be racially discriminatory. Otherwise the CYWR income management 
regime will be held to be a special measure. Based on income management theoretically being 
implemented to assist to achieve equality for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, it is 
labelled a special measure by the Queensland and Commonwealth Governments. On the basis of 
other judicial decisions regarding paternalistic measures, income management is likely to be found 
to be a special measure by a court,45 if social security is not held to be property.   
                                                 
39  Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) s 10(3); Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders (Queensland Discriminatory 
Laws) Act 1975 (Cth) s 5. 
40  Aurukun Shire Council v CEO Office of Liquor Gaming and Racing in the Department of Treasury [2010] QCA 
37, [51] (McMurdo P), [138] (Keane JA), [265] (Philippides J); Bropho v  State of Western Australia [2008] 
FCAFC 100, [78]–[79] (Ryan, Moore and Tamberlin JJ); Maloney v The Queen [2013] HCA 28, [146] (Kiefel J), 
[219] (Bell J). 
41  Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) s 10(1). Emphasis added. 
42  Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) s 8(1). 
43  Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351 [365]–[366] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby, Hayne JJ).  
44  Peter Nygh and Peter Butt (eds), Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictionary (Butterworths, 1997) 87. 
45  This is on the basis of judicial reasoning in the following cases: Maloney v The Queen [2013] HCA 28; Morton v 
Queensland Police Service [2010] QCA 160; Aurukun Shire Council v Chief Executive, Office of Liquor, Gaming 
and Racing in the Department of Treasury [2010] QCA 37. 
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III THE CAPE YORK WELFARE REFORM – CONTINUING PATERNALISM 
The Family Responsibilities Commission Act 2008 (Qld) (‘FRC Act’) established the Family 
Responsibilities Commission (‘FRC’), a statutory body which is part of the CYWR and is 
empowered to order that individuals be subject to income management,46 where certain social 
responsibilities are not met (as will be explained below). The FRC was initially implemented in 
the Aurukun, Coen, Hope Vale and Mossman Gorge communities predominantly consisting of 
Aboriginal peoples, almost 3000 people in total. Prior to its commencement on 1 July 2008 the 
then Premier, Anna Bligh, stated that approximately 1800 people who receive social security 
payments or Community Development Employment Project wages could be subject to decisions 
of the FRC.47  Initially, the FRC was to run for four years and was to cease on 1 January 2012; 
however, progressive amendments have extended its operation, and now the FRC is permanent.48 
In 2014 the FRC was extended to the Aboriginal community of Doomadgee in the Gulf of 
Carpentaria with the intention of increasing school attendance.49         
The main object of the FRC Act is to restore ‘socially responsible standards of behaviour and local 
authority’, as well as helping people resume responsibility for themselves, their family and 
community.50 The objects of income management are to direct social security payments to ‘priority 
needs’ of the recipient, their children, their partner and any other dependants; as well as to provide 
budgeting support to meet these needs, to reduce spending on alcohol, gambling, cigarettes and 
pornography, to reduce harassment associated with others asking for money, to encourage socially 
responsible behaviour relating to care and education of children and to improve protection 
provided to recipients and their families.51   
From the commencement of the FRC on 1 July 2008 until December 2014, 665 people in the four 
Cape York communities had been income managed with 1520 orders, which include extensions 
and amendments.52 This indicates that a number of people had their order extended or received 
more than one order. Of the FRC’s clients, 38 per cent have been subject to income management 
since its commencement. At the time the FRC did not have the power to income manage people 
in Doomadgee.53 In 2014, the FRC Act extended its jurisdiction to include notifications to the FRC 
of those living in one of the CYWR communities convicted in District and Supreme Courts and 
                                                 
46  Family Responsibility Commission Act 2008 (Qld) s 69(1)(b)(iv). 
47  Anna Bligh, The Queensland Cabinet and Ministerial Directory, ‘Ground-Breaking Legislation: Family 
Responsibilities Commission to be Introduced into Queensland Parliament Today’ (Media Statements, 26 
February 2008) <http://statements.qld.gov.au/Statement/Id/56680>. 
48  It was extended, initially until 31 December 2012, then 31 December 2013, then 31 December 2014 and the 
Commonwealth extended it until 31 December 2015, Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) ss 
123UF(1)(g), (2)(h). Clause 10 of the Family Responsibility Amendment Bill 2014 (Qld), which was passed on 
14 October 2014, removes the end date for the scheme to continue indefinitely. 
49  Family Responsibilities Commission, ‘Quarterly Report’ (No. 24, April 2014 to June 2014) 8 
<http://www.frcq.org.au/sites/default/files/Final%20FRC%20Quarterly%20Report%20No%2022.pdf>; Family 
Responsibilities Commission Amendment Regulation (No 1)(Qld) 2014 1.  
50  Family Responsibility Commission Act 2008 (Qld) s 4. 
51  Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 123TB. 
52  Family Responsibilities Commission ‘Quarterly Report’ (No. 26, October 2014 to December 2014) 8 
<http://www.frcq.org.au/?q=content/quarterly-reports>. 
53  Ibid. 
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for parents or carers of children convicted under the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld).54 The aim of 
referrals when children are convicted is to ‘ensure greater parental/carer responsibility for the 
young person’s offending behaviour and reduce the current trajectory of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander young people from youth detention into the adult criminal justice system’.55   
The assumption underlying the CYWR is that alcohol abuse and ‘passive welfare dependence’ 
have caused deterioration of social norms in Cape York communities over the past 30 or 40 years.56 
However, this period coincides with the rapid departure of longstanding Government and mission 
control from these communities. That regime from the 1890s to 1970s had prohibited the exercise 
of traditional Aboriginal authority, although this has never been acknowledged by the Queensland 
or Commonwealth Governments. As the Commonwealth Government now concedes, conducting 
tasks which people should be able to manage themselves dissolves personal capacity and 
responsibility.57 However, this fails to explain the willingness of both Governments to further 
intervene in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ lives in relation to managing their social 
security payments. Rather than admitting the deleterious effects of control and past management 
of individuals’ lives by successive Queensland Governments and missions, and the sudden 
withdrawal of these processes, focus has been on blaming individuals for their predicament.58  
The CYWR is essentially based on ideals and controls said to be aimed at achieving ‘social norms’ 
and ‘social responsibility’. The Commonwealth Government describes it as ‘a process of moving 
from passive welfare dependence to engagement in the real economy’.59  This involves people in 
these remote Aboriginal communities gaining ‘real jobs’ despite jobs not being available and high 
unemployment rates,60 owning their own homes even though most lack financial capacity and 
limiting the roles of Government at all levels in Aboriginal peoples’ lives so that they are treated 
in the same way as ‘mainstream Australia’. These goals are viewed as necessary by both 
Governments and the Cape York Institute for Policy and Leadership (CYI)61 on the basis that Cape 
York is ‘socially underdeveloped’.62   
In an attempt to reinstate local authority in each community, elders have been appointed as 
Commissioners to the FRC. The FRC must sit with at least two local Commissioners from the 
relevant community and a legally qualified Commissioner,63 unless the legally qualified 
Commissioner considers it appropriate for three local Commissioners to sit.64  The legally qualified 
                                                 
54  Family Responsibility Commission Act 2008 (Qld) s 43. 
55  Explanatory Notes, Family Responsibilities Commission Amendment Bill 2014 (Qld) 2. 
56  Department of Social Services, Families and Children, above n 8. 
57  Ibid. 
58  Shelley Bielefeld, ‘Compulsory Income Management, Indigenous Peoples and Structural Violence – Implications 
for Citizenship and Autonomy’ (2014/2015) 18(1) Australian Indigenous Law Review 99, 99–105. 
59  Department of Social Services, Families and Children, above n 8. 
60  For example, 28.7 per cent of working age people in Aurukun are unemployed, this figure is 32.2 per cent in Hope 
Vale, while the Queensland figure is 6.1 per cent. Coen has a large population of Aboriginal people, its 
unemployment rate is 10.1 per cent and the population (100) of Mossman Gorge is considered too small for the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics to provide this data, Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Census QuickStats’ 2011. 
61  Cape York Institute for Policy and Leadership, above n 8.  
62  Department of Social Services, Families and Children, above n 8. 
63  Family Responsibilities Commission Act 2008 (Qld) s 50. 
64  Ibid s 50A. 
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Commissioner is required to monitor all decisions.65 Six local Commissioners from each 
community have been appointed to the FRC.66  
The powers of the FRC are enlivened when it receives notices from Government agencies in 
relation to community members receiving Centrelink payments who are deemed to not be meeting 
certain obligations.67 Obligations under the FRC Act include enrolling children in school and 
requiring adequate attendance,68 caring for children and not having child protection notifications 
or interventions,69 not incurring criminal convictions,70 and compliance with tenancy 
agreements.71 The FRC decides if the person is required to attend a conference. At a conference 
the FRC may take no further action,72 reprimand the person,73 recommend attendance at a support 
service,74 direct the person to attend support services,75 or have Centrelink income manage their 
payments.76 Other Centrelink recipients are generally not required to meet these obligations except 
for isolated trials around the country.77   
For example, in the Northern Territory a person may be referred for income management by a 
social worker, a child protection authority or the Northern Territory Alcohol Mandatory Treatment 
Tribunal.78 However, income management in the Northern Territory is much broader, applying 
where people have been in receipt of particular types of benefits for certain periods of time. 
Assumptions are made simply due to a person’s circumstance of being on Centrelink payments. 
Until 2010, income management in the Northern Territory directly targeted residents of prescribed 
Aboriginal communities, it was then applied more broadly after the reinstatement of the RDA, 
                                                 
65  Ibid s 50B. 
66  Department of Social Services, Families and Children, above n 8. 
67  KPMG, ‘Implementation Review of the Family Responsibilities Commission’ (Final Report, Department of 
Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, September 2010) 152; Noel Pearson, ‘There Is 
Nothing The Government Can Do For You That You Are Unwilling To Do For Yourself’ (Sir Robert Menzies 
Lecture, Cape York Institute for Policy and Leadership, 27 February 2011) 2. 
68  Family Responsibilities Commission Act 2008 (Qld) ss 40, 41. 
69  Ibid s 42. 
70  Ibid s 43.  
71  Ibid s 44.  
72  Ibid s 69(1)(a). 
73  Ibid s 69(1)(b)(i). 
74  Ibid s 69(1)(b)(ii). 
75  Ibid s 69(1)(b)(iii). 
76  Ibid s 69(1)(b)(iv).   
77  For example, in Bankstown (NSW), Logan, Rockhampton and Livingstone (Queensland), Greater Shepparton 
(Victoria), the Northern Territory, Playford, the Greater Adelaide Region, the Anangu Pitjantjatjara 
Yankunytjatjara (‘APY’) Lands (South Australia), Metropolitan Perth, Peel Region, Kimberley Region, 
Ngaanyatjarra Lands (‘NG Lands’) and Laverton Shire in Western Australia. Australian Government, Department 
of Human Services, ‘Income Management’ 
      <http://www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/services/centrelink/income-management>. 
78  Alcohol Mandatory Treatment Act 2013 (NT) s 13(1) provides: ‘[a]n income management order to be made in 
relation to a person who is an eligible welfare payment recipient that a person is required to be subject to income 
management’; see also s 34 (Tribunal made mandatory treatment order). 
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ostensibly to make it non-discriminatory, despite its practical operation of continuing to 
disproportionately affect Aboriginal people.79 
Before ordering income management, the FRC is required to ‘consider whether it is more 
appropriate in all the circumstances merely to direct the person to attend an appropriate community 
support service under a case plan’.80 Income management is in practise a punitive measure when 
used where a person is deemed to not comply with their social obligations, does not attend an FRC 
conference,81 or when a person does not conform to a case plan and attend a service.82 The FRC 
does not determine that people are financially incompetent. Importantly, there is no internal right 
of review, or a right to appeal to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal or the Social Security 
Appeals Tribunal. The only available avenues if a person disagrees with the process or a decision 
are to the Ombudsman or to a Magistrates Court on a question of law.83 The FRC decision cannot 
be stayed pending appeal.84   
The income managed amount of a person’s payment affects between 60 per cent to 90 per cent of 
the amount received for regular payments and 100 per cent of one off payments such as Baby 
Bonus.85 Income management orders exist for a period of between three and 12 months. On 1 
January 2014, FRC Commissioners gained the power to income manage 90 per cent of a person’s 
payment where the person failed to comply with case plans and ‘resisted engagement with support 
services’.86 It is, therefore, clearly punitive. In fact, former Assistant Minister for Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Affairs in Queensland, David Kempton, views extreme welfare reform 
measures as ‘punishment’, particularly the ‘healthy welfare card’ suggested by Andrew Forrest.87 
The proposed ‘healthy welfare card’ would confine the full amount of social security payments, 
which can only be spent using the card.88   
In 2014, The Forrest Review: Creating Parity was released, noting that the ‘healthy welfare card’ 
will disproportionately affect Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, acknowledging that 
almost half who are working age rely on social security payments, compared to 17 per cent of all 
Australians.89 Forrest also understands that income management may be considered paternalistic, 
                                                 
79  J Rob Bray et al, ‘Evaluating New Income Management in the Northern Territory: First Evaluation Report’ 
(University of New South Wales Social Policy Research Centre, July 2012) 47. 
80  Family Responsibilities Commission Act 2008 (Qld) s 69(2). 
81  Ibid s 66. 
82  Ibid s 81. 
83  Explanatory Notes, Family Responsibilities Commission Bill 2008 (Qld) 11; Family Responsibilities Commission 
Act 2008 (Qld) s 111. 
84  Ibid s 112. 
85  Department of Social Services, Families and Children, ‘Income Management for Cape York Welfare Reform’ 
<http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/our-responsibilities/families-and-children/publications-articles/cape-york-welfare-
reform-fact-sheets/income-management-for-cape-york-welfare-reform>. 
86  Cape York Institute for Policy and Leadership, ‘Changes to CIM’ Cape York News (December 2013) 11. 
87  David Kempton, Member for Cook, Assistant Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs, ‘Forrest 
Recommendations Need to Bring Communities Along’ (6 August 2014) <http://davidkempton.com.au/forrest-
recommendations-need-to-bring-communities-along/>.  
88  Andrew Forrest, ‘The Forrest Review: Creating Parity’ (Commonwealth of Australia, 2014) 27.  
89  Ibid. 
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but fails to see the ‘healthy welfare card’ as derived from the same premise that social security 
recipients cannot manage their payments. This is despite him saying: 
We need to make the necessary changes to Australia’s welfare system to empower individuals to 
use it as it was intended. Welfare is provided to help people build healthy lifestyles and make the 
best choices they can for themselves and their families — particularly their children. It is a social 
safety net of last resort and should never be a destination, or support poor choices.90   
If the ‘healthy welfare card’ is implemented, there is no discretionary amount and no end date to 
income management for those receiving social security payments. Income management is a 
continuation of the historical treatment of Aboriginal people based on the discriminatory belief 
that they are not capable of managing their property, including money. This fundamentally fails to 
acknowledge the lack of jobs available and attendant high levels of unemployment in many 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities.  
The purpose of most social security payments is to provide a safety net for people who are unable 
to work for a range of reasons, and to assist people to look for work and to study. At present, these 
payments are susceptible to income management.91 This income management allocates a portion 
of the social security payments that must be spent on ‘priority needs’,92 such as bills, rent, 
groceries, and clothes. Management of these payments precludes a person from ever receiving 
their entire payment and further restricts where and how it can be spent. Similar to historical 
control of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities, where Protectors managed money 
and allowed spending on ‘priority needs’, in the contemporary context, Centrelink is this 
‘Protector’.93 If a person wants to spend their income managed money on non-excluded items not 
deemed to be ‘priority needs’, they must seek permission from Centrelink to make the payment.94 
The request will not be approved if payment for ‘priority needs’ has not been met. A compounding 
issue arising out of this management system of social security, is the presumption that a person 
understands and can fully navigate the system. 
IV HOW CAN SOCIAL SECURITY BE PROPERTY? 
In Health Insurance Commission v Peverill 95 McHugh J stated that:  
Property … is not confined to physical things. Under the general law, the term ‘property’ has 
ceased to describe any res, or object of sense, at all, and has become merely a bundle of legal 
relations — rights, powers, privileges, immunities.96 
                                                 
90  Ibid. 
91  Australian Government, ‘Guide to Social Security Law’ (Version 1.197, Department of Families, Housing, 
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, 12 August 2013) 
<http://guidesacts.fahcsia.gov.au/guides_acts/ssg/ssguide-11/ssguide-11.2/ssguide-11.2.5.html>.  
92  Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 123TH.  
93  Bray et al, above n 79, 234–235, 254. 
94  Ibid. 
95  Health Insurance Commission v Peverill (1994) 179 CLR 226. 
96  Ibid [263]–[264]. 
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The Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictionary broadly defines property as ‘every type of 
right (that is, a claim recognised by law), interest, or thing which is legally capable of ownership, 
and which has a value’.97 Property describes a legal relationship with an object, rather than the 
object itself.98 In fact, the character of the object is irrelevant in determining whether a relationship 
is proprietary in nature.99  Ownership also varies, capable of being equitable, legal, beneficial, 
joint, several, general, or partial.100   
Because property describes a relationship, what may encompass property rights is extremely broad 
with potential for expansion.101 For example, the relationship may exist in a number of forms 
including possession, a right to possession, ownership, or a lesser right conferred by common law 
or legislation,102 or the right to exclusive physical control of the property.103 A right to possession 
includes possession yet to actualise, or a state where a person has been denied enjoyment of 
possession, for example where property is stolen.104 Social security payments are considered by 
academic writers/commentators to be inalienable.105 Section 60 of the Social Security 
(Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) states that ‘[A] social security payment is absolutely inalienable’; 
however, this is now subject to income management provisions.106 Income management can be 
described as denying a person the right to possess the totality of their social security payment. 
It is accepted that despite being legally enforceable, property rights are not absolute. For example, 
Parliaments and courts can place restrictions on property rights or the way they are exercised.107 
However, restricting property rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, and not 
others, is fundamentally racially discriminatory. This was clearly recognised in the mid-1970s 
when the Commonwealth Parliament identified that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ 
property rights in Queensland were vulnerable to interference by the Queensland Parliament and 
legislated accordingly. Despite the race-neutral language of s 69(1)(b)(iv) of the FRC Act, which 
relates to income management and the FRC Act generally, its operation and effect render it racially 
discriminatory, as these provisions only apply to communities that are predominantly Aboriginal.  
Even if income management were found to apply generally to all inhabitants in the four Cape York 
communities and Doomadgee, not just Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, s 10 of the 
                                                 
97  Nygh and Butt (eds), above n 44, 321.  
98  Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351 [365]–[366] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby, Hayne JJ).  
99  Samantha Hepburn, Principles of Property Law (Routledge Cavendish, 3rd ed, 2006) 21.  
100  Nygh and Butt (eds), above n 44, 290–291.  
101  Hepburn, above n 99, 3.  
102  John Tarrant, ‘Property Rights to Stolen Money’ (2005) 32 University of Western Australia Law Review 234, 236. 
103  Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 60(1). 
104  Tarrant, above n 102, 241. 
105  Peter Yeend and Coral Dow, ‘Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Welfare Payment Reform) Bill 
2007’ Bills Digest, No 27 of 2007–2008, Parliamentary Library, 2007, 4–5; Jon Altman and Melissa Johns, 
‘Indigenous Welfare Reform in the Northern Territory and Cape York: A Comparative Analysis’ (Working Paper 
No. 44/2008, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, 2008) 22. 
106  Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 60(2)(aa).  
107  Hepburn, above n 99, 4. See also Bropho v State of Western Australia [2008] FCAFC 100 [80],  [83] (Ryan, Moore, 
Tamberlin JJ); Aurukun Shire Council v CEO Office of Liquor Gaming and Racing in the Department of Treasury 
[2010] QCA 37 [66], [71] (McMurdo P), [158] (Keane JA), [266] (Philippides J); Maloney v The Queen [2013] 
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RDA is directed at the ‘practical operation and effect’ of legislation, not simply its form.108  This 
is now well established in case law and is crucial in showing that management of social security 
as property applies based on race,109 not as a law of general application.110 However, the provisions 
of the FRC Act indicate that it is intended to apply to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. 
Being Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander is an eligibility requirement for appointment as a local 
Commissioner.111 An appropriate understanding of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander culture 
and history is required of the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner,112 and Registrar.113 One of 
the principles for administering the FRC Act is the requirement to take into account ‘Aboriginal 
tradition and Island custom ... in matters involving Aboriginal people or Torres Strait Islanders’.114 
In relation to differential treatment of people in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities 
in terms of possession of alcohol, French CJ in Maloney v The Queen115 stated:  
It is not a sufficient answer to the appellant’s complaint about those provisions that she was not 
deprived of her property and that property rights are frequently qualified by regulation, especially 
in the case of alcohol. In this case, the impugned provisions had the effect that Indigenous persons 
who were the Palm Island community, including the appellant, could not enjoy a right of 
ownership of property, namely alcohol, to the same extent as non-Indigenous people outside that 
community. The impugned provisions effected an operational discrimination notwithstanding the 
race-neutral language of s 168B of the Liquor Act, under which the appellant was charged.116 
In 1977, Professor Ronald Sackville concluded that, although social security was not property, it 
was progressing to a greater level of certainty for its beneficiaries in terms of becoming an 
entitlement. This was in contrast to social security as a privilege, which may or may not be 
bestowed on a person, based on criteria set by the Government including discretionary terms.117 
At that time, broad discretion was provided to the Director or Minister to decide who should 
receive payments and the level of payment.118 Sackville argued that once legislation provided 
clarity on eligibility it may create a right to social security. This would provide aggrieved 
applicants with a legal avenue to claim against incorrectly assessed eligibility criteria.119  However, 
in the case of Stec v United Kingdom the European Court of Human Rights did not find a right to 
receive social security payments.120 It held that a right to social security may only arise where the 
                                                 
108  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1 [115]; Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70 [97], [99] (Mason J 
dissenting), [216]–[219] (Brennan, Toohey and Gaudron JJ), [231]–[232] (Deane J).  
109  Maloney v The Queen [2013] HCA 28 [38] (French CJ), [84] (Hayne J) with whom [112] (Crennan J) agreed, 
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110  Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) s 10(3); Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders (Queensland Discriminatory 
Laws Act) 1975 (Cth) s 5(2). 
111  Family Responsibilities Commission Act 2008 (Qld) s 18. 
112  Ibid s 17. 
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114  Ibid s 5(2)(c). 
115  [2013] HCA 28. 
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recipient has made compulsory contributions.121 This is similar to insurance schemes covering 
health issues preventing a person from working.        
In preferring to define social security as having the potential to develop into an ‘entitlement’, rather 
than a property right per se, Sackville stated that: 
The notion of entitlement embraces but goes beyond the legal right to enforce a claim to social 
security. It involves the eligible social security claimant being seen as entitled to the benefit 
claimed, not only by the legal system, but also by those responsible for administering benefits and 
indeed the community as a whole. The move from privilege towards entitlement is far from 
complete and there are many obstacles to the transformation, including the disfavour into which 
social security appears to fall in times of economic hardship. However, changes in the law and the 
way in which social security is administered will hasten the process.122       
Michael Asimow also argues that where the Government decision to provide a particular benefit 
is discretionary, it should not be treated as property.123 In Williams v Commonwealth of 
Australia,124 Crennan J referred to social security in terms of a personal entitlement.125 She also 
explained that allowances, pensions, child endowment, and benefits of services provided under s 
51(xxiiiA) of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Cth) (Constitution) are 
entitlements to money, goods or services. While these entitlements are not required to be provided 
in terms of financial assistance,126 where they are provided in a different form due to the person’s 
race, this is clearly discriminatory.      
Asimow explains that ‘property’ not only includes traditional forms, such as real estate and money, 
but also statutory entitlements, which lack traditional elements of property, including 
assignability.127 In Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth,128 Brennan J stated 
that assignability is not always an essential characteristic of a right of property and that some 
legislation expresses property as being inalienable.129 In Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v 
Yeend,130 Isaacs J said that assignability is a consequence of a proprietary right, not a test.131 
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55707/00, 18 February 2009), [91]–[92] where the Court considered complex historical, economic and political 
issues relating to the cessation of the Soviet Union to assess whether the legal system should have created an 
expectation to receive the social security benefit.  
122  Sackville, above n 117, 252.   
123  Michael Asimow (ed), A Guide to Federal Agency Adjudication (American Bar Association, 2003) 11. 
124  Williams v Commonwealth of Australia [2014] HCA 23. 
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Therefore, while assignability may indicate a property right, it is not an essential defining 
element.132 
In considering whether social security can be defined as property, it is important to consider that 
both s 10(3) of the RDA and s 5 of the ATSI (QDL) Act were implemented to stop management of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ property, which included their wages, without their 
consent. This situation is similar to the CYWR with respect to social security payments, including 
the right to possession and use of payments.  
In Health Insurance Commission v Peverill,133 social security in the form of a Medicare benefit 
and its assignment to a doctor were discussed as property for the purposes of s 51(xxxi)134 
(compulsory acquisition) of the Constitution.135 Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ held that: 
It is significant that the rights that have been terminated or diminished are statutory entitlements 
to receive payments from consolidated revenue which were not based on antecedent proprietary 
rights recognised by the general law. Rights of that kind are rights which, as a general rule, are 
inherently susceptible of variation. That is particularly so in the case of both the nature and 
quantum of welfare benefits, such as the provision of medicare benefits in respect of medical 
services.136    
The above case draws a distinction between common law property rights and statutory based 
rights, such as social security due to the vulnerability of the latter to amendment. While this is 
important in compulsory acquisition cases, a statutory property right for the purposes of a 
discrimination argument differs where people are treated differently based on race. For the 
purposes of s 5 of the ATSI (QDL) Act and s 10(3) of the RDA finding social security as property 
is possible, irrespective of its vulnerability. Treating Aboriginal people differently by imposing 
income management of social security payments exceeds any issue of vulnerability, by 
discriminating solely on the basis of race. 
Recent racial discrimination cases also indicate a wide interpretation of property. In Aurukun Shire 
Council & Anor v CEO Office of Liquor Gaming and Racing in the Department of Treasury,137 
President McMurdo explained the common law definition of property as being broad, including 
‘every type of right or claim recognised by law including any interest which is legally capable of 
ownership and which has a value’.138  President McMurdo said it was appropriate to adopt a broad 
approach when interpreting a provision such as s 10 RDA.139 President McMurdo emphasised that 
                                                 
132  See, eg, St Vincent de Paul Society Qld v Ozcare Ltd [2009] QCA 335, [36] (Muir JA), with whom McMurdo P 
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(Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ); [9] (Dawson J); [14] (Toohey J); [22], [24] (McHugh J). 
136  Ibid [10] (Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ). 
137 Aurukun Shire Council & Anor v CEO Office of Liquor Gaming and Racing in the Department of Treasury [2010] 
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the test to determine whether an interest is property is not an absolute or unqualified test applicable 
in all circumstances.140 Similarly the Full Court of the Federal Court in Bropho v State of Western 
Australia,141 held that there is nothing in the RDA or the ICERD, ‘for concluding that rights to 
property must be understood as ownership of a kind analogous to forms of property which have 
been inherited and adapted from the English system of property law or conferred by statute’.142 
This clearly applies to property rights referred to in s 10(1) of the RDA by reference to Art 5(d)(v) 
ICERD, but the question is whether the ICERD is also applicable to ‘property owned’ within the 
meaning of s 10(3). Section 10(3) does not, by its words, limit ‘property owned’ to domestic 
interpretation. For s 10(3) to be invoked it requires a law containing a provision authorising 
property to be managed or preventing termination of the management of property. Given that the 
applicable law in relation to “property” will likely be confined in domestic application, it is 
possible that “property” will be similarly interpreted. The context of the enactment of the RDA is 
designed to implement the ICERD, and its historical background to eliminate racial discrimination 
indicates a wider interpretation is appropriate, especially as the 1975 Acts were targeting wages as 
property.          
In Maloney v The Queen,143 Bell J acknowledged that because of the legislative restrictions on the 
Aboriginal community of Palm Island, Aboriginal people on Palm Island enjoy the right to own 
alcohol to a lesser extent than persons (most of whom are not Aboriginal) elsewhere in 
Queensland.144  Justice Bell agreed with McMurdo P, that the relevant right was not the right to 
own alcohol, but the right to own alcohol in the same manner and extent as non-Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people.145 The emphasis in this reasoning is on a broad interpretation of 
property rights, focussed on equality. In Hayne J’s view ‘[t]he ambiguity and looseness with which 
the word “property” can be used is notorious.’146           
In the United States and internationally, in certain circumstances social security has been deemed 
to be property, generally based on it being an entitlement. The United States Supreme Court case 
of Board of Regents v Roth,147 held that: 
‘[p]roperty interests ... are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or 
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law — rules or understandings 
that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits’.148  
 Based on expectation and reliance on social security, Stewart J held that:  
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or 
desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a 
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legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect 
those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily 
undermined.149 
In Goldberg v Kelly,150 the United States Supreme Court held that a property interest exists in 
certain Government entitlements, requiring notice and a hearing prior to a Governmental entity 
removing them. The court said that welfare benefits are property and enjoy the same legal 
protections as other property.151 It will be seen below that the European Court of Human Rights 
(‘ECHR’) has a similar view of social security as a form of property.  
In finding social security to be property the ECHR relies upon Article 1 of Protocol No 1 (A1P1) 
to the European Convention on Human Rights.152 This provision states:   
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall 
be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided 
for by law and by the general principles of international law.  
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such 
laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or 
to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.  
Internationally, in broad terms, two different social security schemes exist. These schemes can be 
briefly explained as being based on contributions by individuals, or those funded by general taxes 
(non-contribution). Initially ECHR decisions only protected prior paid contribution social security 
benefits under A1P1.153  However, since its 2005 decision of Stec v United Kingdom,154 (‘Stec’) 
the ECHR has found that social security payments based on taxes or non-contribution schemes, 
similar to the scheme in Australia, entail a proprietary right. Since then the court has deemed 
numerous types of non-contribution based social security payments to be property. Some of the 
cases combine Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights which prohibits 
discrimination, with A1P1. Article 14, only invoked when one or more of the Convention’s other 
articles are invoked,155  states that: 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.   
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There is no right to acquire property under A1P1 and the state is free to decide on whether a social 
security scheme exists and its nature. However, where a state creates a social security scheme, it 
must be compatible with Article 14, regardless of whether it is contributory or non-contributory.156 
The ECHR cases generally address a change in criteria resulting in a substantial and unacceptable 
reduction of payment to people receiving social security payments,157 or a discrepancy between 
men and women in relation to the age of eligibility, or nationality. While none of these cases appear 
to include the state managing recipients’ payments, the characterisation of social security payments 
as property is relevant.      
In Stec, the United Kingdom offered a social security payment called a Reduced Earnings 
Allowance (‘REA’) which compensated loss of earnings for employees who had suffered a work 
related injury. Entitlement to a REA expired when the recipient reached the statutory age 
for pension entitlement. Some recipients receiving a REA were changed to a Retirement 
Allowance (‘RA’) which was of a lesser amount, when they reached retirement age. While the 
statutory retirement age in the UK was at the time 60 for women and 65 for men, the retirement 
age for women is gradually increasing to 65 by the year 2020. Five individuals in receipt of a RA 
or a REA applied to the ECHR for a decision on whether the differing payments received by men 
and women in similar circumstances were discriminatory.158 In particular, Mrs Stec argued that 
the measures of reducing payments were discriminatory (Art 14) breaching her right to property 
(A1P1).159   
The Government argued that non-contributory benefits were not covered by A1P1 as A1P1 did 
not provide a right to receive benefits from the state. It also said that the state had discretion in 
terms of provision it made for its citizens, there being no right under the European Convention on 
Human Rights to acquire possessions. However, a distinction was made by the Government in 
relation to contributory benefits, acknowledging that because individuals made contributions they 
had a proprietary claim.160   
The applicants’ argument was that REA and RA payments fell within A1P1 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. They relied on the ECHR reasoning in Gaygusuz v Austria.161 In 
that case, the ECHR said that the statutory right to emergency assistance was a pecuniary right 
under A1P1 without it ‘being necessary to rely solely on the link between entitlement to emergency 
assistance and the obligation to pay “taxes or other contributions”’.162              
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In Stec the ECHR held that: 
In the modern, democratic State, many individuals are, for all or part of their lives, completely 
dependent for survival on social security and welfare benefits. Many domestic legal systems 
recognise that such individuals require a degree of certainty and security, and provide for benefits 
to be paid — subject to the fulfilment of the conditions of eligibility — as of right. Where an 
individual has an assertable right under domestic law to a welfare benefit, the importance of that 
interest should also be reflected by holding Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to be applicable.163 
Unfortunately, the Court did not provide analysis of social security as a property right, rather it is 
portrayed as being intrinsically capable of definition as a proprietary interest due to fulfilment of 
eligibility criteria established by statute. It was explained that if a state has legislation in place 
‘providing for the payment as of right of a welfare benefit — whether conditional or not on the 
prior payment of contributions — the legislation must be regarded as generating a proprietary 
interest falling within the ambit of A1P1 for persons satisfying its requirements’.164 This was 
reaffirmed in Luczak v Poland.165  By 2007, social security complaints which combined A1Pl and 
Art 14 were automatically accepted by the ECHR as entailing a property right at issue.166 These 
cases do not restrict decisions of the state as to whether it creates a social security system or the 
type of system; however, where the state decides to create a system it must do so without 
discriminating (Article 14).167 Non-discrimination appears to be inextricably linked to the ECHR’s 
interpretation of social security as property, with an absence of explanation of its defining 
characteristics.168 
Ingrid Leijten identified that the ECHR provides a broader interpretation of A1P1 in non-
discrimination cases than otherwise. Cases are brought within the ambit of property despite there 
being no possession. This appears to be because the focus has shifted to the importance of 
prohibition of discrimination, requiring the state to provide non-discriminatory social security 
benefits.169 
In Moskal v Poland,170 Ms Moskal complained that a pension to look after her sick son that she 
had been erroneously receiving for ten months had been revoked. Despite the pension being 
lawfully revoked the court found that ‘a property right was generated by the favourable evaluation 
of the applicant’s dossier attached to the pension application which had been lodged in good faith 
and by the Social Security Board’s recognition of the right’.171 In making the decision the court 
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considered both that Ms Moskal had resigned from employment of 20 years in reliance on the 
decision that she was able to receive the pension, and the effects of the decision on Ms Moskal and 
her family.172  This case was decided based on interference with a proprietary right, not on non-
discrimination and an order was made for pecuniary damages.173 The decision highlights the 
importance of certainty for people relying upon representations that they are eligible for social 
security. However, this decision goes beyond finding social security as property based on 
eligibility criteria. 
These cases demonstrate that changes to social security policies can be found to interfere with 
existing property rights or legitimate expectations. It is understandable that the proprietary nature 
of social security requires protection when social security forms a person’s basic means of living 
and the effects of disproportionate interference are considered.174 Therefore, interferences must be 
lawful, comply with the principle of non-discrimination, be in the public interest and proportionate 
to their aim.175 This is similar to the approach used at international law and by some countries 
when assessing the validity of limitations of particular human rights by the state.   
V INCOME MANAGEMENT IN CAPE YORK 
Examples of judicial findings of social security payments as property are important to the argument 
that s 10(3) of the RDA and s 5 of the ATSI (QDL) Act prohibit another person managing the 
property of an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander person without their consent. The only 
exception to non-consensual management of property is when it is in accordance with legislation 
of general application and, therefore, does not discriminate, directly or indirectly, against 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. It is unlikely that the FRC Act would be found to be 
legislation of general application due to the predominant Aboriginal population of the four 
communities, the tailoring of the legislation for Aboriginal people, including Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander authority figures as Local Commissioners and its application. Previous 
legislation, with provisions not explicitly aimed at a racial group, has been held to have the 
operation and effect of targeting a specific group based on their race and this is racial 
discrimination.176 The broad definition of property in Australia and the flexibility of its defining 
elements, along with international judicial support, suggest that an argument for social security 
payments as property could be mounted in Australia. While there is limited guidance in domestic 
case law on the chance of success of such a legal argument, it appears to present the best avenue 
in challenging income management of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. Post Maloney 
v The Queen,177 it is likely that income management would be held to be a special measure. 
Therefore s 10(3) of the RDA and s 5 of the ATSI (QDL) Act are integral to the argument to 
challenge the discriminatory nature of income management in Cape York. Reference to the history 
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of this legislation, as acknowledged by the Commonwealth Parliament when debating and enacting 
these Acts, may also support social security being defined as property.178  
Section 69(1)(b)(iv) of the FRC Act gives the FRC the power to notify the Centrelink Secretary 
that a person’s social security payment is to be income managed. Section 10(3) of the RDA by 
reference to s 10(1) enables Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people whose property is being 
managed without their consent to enjoy their right to that property to the same extent as persons 
of other races, colour or national or ethnic origin. Section 10(1) applies where even only some 
members of a particular race do not enjoy a particular right to the same extent as members of 
another race.179 It is, therefore, arguable that s 69(1)(b)(iv) of the FRC Act is inconsistent with s 
10(3) of the RDA and s 5 of the ATSI (QDL) Act. If either or both of s 10(3) of the RDA or s 5 of 
the ATSI (QDL) Act apply, their operation will prohibit what the state law permits, therefore, s 109 
of the Constitution is enlivened and s 69(1)(b)(iv) of the FRC Act is invalid to the extent of the 
inconsistency,180 and the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) will not be engaged.181  
If there is a real need for a person’s social security or other property to be managed legitimately, 
then an application can be made for an administrator to be appointed under the Guardianship and 
Administration Act 2000 (Qld). Under this process, the Public Trustee is appointed to administer 
payment; however, this can only occur if the criteria relating to diminished capacity under the 
legislation applies. This legislation does not distinguish between people based on race or other 
characteristics associated with race, but is based on need.    
Even though income management under the CYWR is triggered when certain obligations are 
deemed not to be met, rather than through a blanket approach, colonial concepts of the way in 
which Aboriginal people should behave and need to be managed remain embedded in the FRC 
Act. The paternalistic protectionist process is punitive, racial and continues to be based on a policy 
of assimilation, rather than understandings of difference. The early 1970s provided a crucial 
window of opportunity to deal with these attitudes. The Commonwealth Labor Government took 
the important step of legislating to stamp out Queensland provisions which discriminated against 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. The fact that specific legislation was aimed at 
Queensland and similar provisions exist in current legislation suggest that special protection is 
required due to the entrenched historical and legislative regime in Queensland. The income 
management component of the CYWR indicates that this special protection remains necessary. 
This reveals a lack of reflection by Governments on the effects of previous paternalistic legislation 
on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and that similar legislation will not achieve a 
different outcome. 
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